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Radiocommunication spectrum and parking places for satel-
lites have great value' because they provide the physical means for
transmitting information, communications, and entertainment
("ICE"), major elements in the global economy. While intangible,
like the air, spectrum provides a medium used by transmitting
equipment to deliver valuable content to consumers. Orbital park-
ing places for satellites have a closer resemblance to real estate, but
the slots used by satellites providing ICE service typically locate in
a relatively narrow arc 22,300 miles above the equator. 2
* Mr. Rob Frieden is a Professor of Telecommunications at Pennsylvania
State University.
1 One example of the intrinsic value in radiocommunication spectrum is the
amount of money parties are willing to bid for the privilege to use it. The United
States Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has captured billions of dol-
lars for the general treasury from the spectrum auctions it has administered. For
an example of FCC auctions, see United States Federal Communications Commis-
sion, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions Summary, available at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/summary.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
2 Most communications satellites appear to hover above the earth, thereby
providing a fixed target to receive signals from earth and send them back down.
Satellite services, including the direct-to-home delivery of video programming,
can be provided more cheaply if earth-based antennas do not have to track a mov-
ing target. Satellites in a "geostationary" condition orbit the earth once every
twenty-four hours. For more background on satellite technology and satellite-
based businesses, see PATRIcK R. PARSONS & ROBERT M. FRIEDEN, THE CABLE AND
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Access to both of these resources involves high stakes and
forces policymakers to balance equity and efficiency concerns. On
the equity side, all nations of the world have an equal right of ac-
cess to these shared resources.3 Most nations have signed treaties
foreclosing national ownership of space resources, 4 including or-
bital slots used by communications satellites.5 Likewise, most na-
tions have signed treaties that bind them to administrative rules
and regulations regarding classification and registration of spec-
trum uses.6
However, a nation's equal right of ownership and access does
not translate into an equivalent level of actual access because de-
veloped nations have acted on their earlier needs for spectrum and
SATELLITE TELEVISION INDUSTRIES (1998); ROB FRIEDEN, MANAGING INTERNET-DRIVEN
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2001).
3 Various treaties and other types of international agreements characterize
outer space and radiocommunication resources located there and on earth as hav-
ing a "common heritage" or as available for the "common benefit of mankind."
A res nullius characterization of outer space would indicate that the
heavens belonged to no one; any resource which could be mined or oth-
erwise appropriated would be available for the taking. This sort of "first-
come, first-serve" standard would give the so-called "spacefaring" pow-
ers a powerful incentive to expand their efforts to develop space. At the
same time, nations unable to afford attempting even to launch satellites
into geosynchronous orbit would find themselves increasingly excluded
from these resources. Such a characterization would, however, create a
first-come, first-serve legal regime. This result would certainly be at
odds with the "common heritage" principle.
Jefferson H. Weaver, Illusion or Reality? State Sovereignty in Outer Space, 10 B.U.
INT'L. L.J. 203, 221-22 (1992).
4 See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo-
ration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. Article II of this Treaty establishes that space "is
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means." Id. art. II. For more information on this is-
sue, see Susan Cahill, Give Me My Space; Implications for Permitting National Appro-
priation of the Geostationary Orbit, 19 WIS. INT'L L.J. 231 (2001); Ricky J. Lee, Reconcil-
ing International Space Law with the Commercial Realities of the Twenty-First Century,
4 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 194 (2000).
5 As part of their commitment to non-appropriation of outer space, nations
have agreed to register their launches with the United Nations. Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Nov. 12, 1974, 1023 U.N.T.S.
15.
6 See Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, Oct. 14,
1994, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-34, 1996 WL 569887 [hereinafter ITU Constitution]
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satellite orbital slots, thereby locking up much of the best re-
sources. Globally accepted concerns for efficient use of shared ra-
diocommunication resources favor the implementation of rules
that avoid and resolve conflicts regarding access, but this process
favors developed nations that typically act earlier than developing
nations. Without such rules, which provide a first-in-time, first-in-
access priority,7 users of spectrum would have little confidence
that they can construct and operate expensive telecommunications
networks without interference from other networks. Shared global
radiocommunications resources have value if and only if social and
commercial transactions can occur across distances without inter-
ruption, distortion, or congestion.
Anyone seeking to use spectrum and parking places for satel-
lites typically confronts a number of challenges including:
" scarcity caused by natural limitations in the number of satel-
lites that can operate in the optimal location where they appear
motionless and can receive signals and relay them back down
to earth;
" scarcity resulting from the laws of physics that limit the num-
ber of simultaneous users of the same radio frequency;
* the fact that only some radio frequencies offer the most desir-
able signal distribution characteristics -e.g., long range geo-
graphical coverage;
* significant differences among nations and commercial ventures
in terms of access to the substantial funds needed to invest in
satellite or radiocommunications facilities such as a local or na-
tional cellular telephone network; and
* the substantial headstart in terms of access to the ideal frequen-
cies and satellite orbital slots enjoyed by developed nations and
their commercial ventures.
Stakeholders and analysts of the many conflicts over access to
shared radiocommunications resources disagree about the best
way to achieve the goal of maximizing public benefits.8 Pro-
7 "Though some obligation to accommodate remains when conflicts between
early and later registrants arise, early registration affords a measure of legitimacy
that supports the first registrant's negotiating position. Because the notification
process affords preferential treatment to early registrants, it is often characterized
as 'first come, first served."' Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationary
Satellite Networks and the International Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1095,1112-13 (2000).
8 One camp asserts that governments need to take aggressive steps to com-
pensate for vast differences in access to ICE resources: "The digital revolution has
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market advocates emphasize the overall contribution to productiv-
ity and welfare achieved when parties can competitively bid for
ownership rights. Advocates expressing equity concerns reject a
parallel between markets for private property ownership rights
and a mechanism for coordinating access to resources shared in
common by all nations.
Policymakers at both national and multilateral levels need to
accommodate and balance both camps. If they fail, stakeholders
may lose patience in the process and resort to unilateral, self-help
strategies that could include launching satellites and using spec-
trum without regard to previously registered uses. Likewise, indi-
vidual nations may ignore global consensus policies regarding the
preferred uses for a specific frequency band and the procedure for
registering and coordinating the launch of satellites into orbit.
This Article will examine the merits of maintaining, revamping,
or abandoning the current administrative processes for managing
international spectrum and satellite orbital slots. It will examine
efficiency-enhancing strategies including the use of competitive
bidding and technological innovations that make it possible for
transformed the lives of many, but also has left untouched the lives of many oth-
ers. As a result, a large segment of the world population misses out on the tre-
mendous political, social, economic, educational, and career opportunities created
by the digital revolution." Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the
Information Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (2002). Another camp empha-
sizes the efficiency and productivity gains in relying on marketplace forces to al-
locate access and use of ICE resources, including radiocommunication spectrum:
The rationales for [government] stewardship and for all-encompassing
regulation that were offered in 1927 [at the onset of radio broadcasting]
were not strong then; they have not grown any stronger with age. There
is a better way. I describe it with a new word: "propertyzing." By that I
mean converting the current system of regulatory permits or licenses to
use the spectrum into a full-fledged system of property rights ownership.
Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing" The Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important,
and How to Begin, 9 MEDIAL. & POL'Y 19 (2000). The latest camp has an even more
libertarian view and would rely on technological innovations to replace the gov-
ernment role of doling out property rights: "Thus, the auction solution to the
problem of FCC regulation may be no better than the previous system of license
allocation .... I argue that the spectrum might be best governed, at least in part,
as a commons," i.e., common property available for access by all. Stuart Buck, Re-
placing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2,
8-9 (2002), available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/02.STLR_2/arti-
clepdf.pdf. See also Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the
Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (1998);
Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's
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more users with possibly different service requirements to share
the same spectrum. Having considered the similarities and differ-
ences in satellites' spectrum use relative to earthbound uses, the
Article concludes that developing a market for orbital slots in lieu
of the existing multilateral coordination and registration process
would impose more costs and problems than benefits.
The transborder technological characteristics of satellites raise
sovereignty, 9 equity, and jurisdictional issues not triggered by eco-
nomic and technological initiatives for terrestrial spectrum use.
Accordingly, neither international, multilateral forums nor domes-
tic policymaking bodies can jettison the status quo and implement
a competitive bidding model for all types of spectrum regardless of
geographical coverage and transmission characteristics. In particu-
lar, spectrum used for international satellite services and access to
the orbital parking places used by satellites do not favor a complete
migration to competitive bidding. Proponents of competitive bid-
ding for spectrum have largely ignored the facts that many nations
lie under a satellite transmission "footprint," that treaty commit-
ments foreclose national or private ownership of outer space re-
sources, and that the likelihood that auctions would exacerbate
parity of access disputes between developed and developing coun-
tries. The Article concludes with recommendations on how do-
mestic and international policymaking forums can improve admin-
istrative processes, including the brokering of financial
inducements to developing nations to refrain from opposing regis-
trations of developed nations, and implementing technologies that
promote interference-free sharing.
1.1. The Current Shift Favoring Efficiency Over Equity Concerns
Currently both developed and developing nations have begun
to favor marketplace decision-making for allocating access rights to
portions of the radiocornmunications spectrum. For example,
many nations have decided to assign spectrum usage rights to the
highest bidder for services using frequency bands having limited
geographical coverage such as cellular radiotelephone service.
Market advocates point to the overall benefits to society when po-
9 "Sovereignty is the situation of the state which has no political superior
over it, but is nevertheless bound by international law." Stanley Hoffrnann, Inter-
national Systems and International Law, in 1 THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER:
TOWARD A THEORY OF WAR PREVENTION 134,164 (Richard A. Falk & Saul H. Mend-
lovitz eds., 1966).
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tential users of public resources have to bid competitively for own-
ership.' 0 For spectrum uses that do not cross borders, marketplace
initiatives have great appeal and plausibility, particularly in light
of the ability of single nations to implement competitive bidding
without adversely impacting spectrum uses and policies in other
nations. Absent a cross-border impact, individual nations can
choose to foster efficiency, generate revenues for the national
treasury, and accrue value for all citizens instead of the lucky few
who previously secured spectrum license grants without payment.
Equity advocates have expressed concerns that even for domes-
tic-only spectrum uses, complete faith in marketplace resource al-
location ignores the broader national and societal interest." Mar-
ket countervailing considerations include supporting spectrum
access by underrepresented constituencies -e.g., women, minori-
ties, the poor, small businesses, and rural residents -or by particu-
lar user groups that serve national security and other compelling
interests-e.g., defense, intelligence gathering, homeland security,
and public safety government agencies.12 Equity considerations
favor affirmative steps to ensure that elites and corporations with
deep pockets do not capture all spectrum access opportunities.
10 See Peter Cramton, The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 727 (1998); Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum
Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1998); Wil-
liam H. Melody, Spectrum Auctions and Efficient Resource Allocation: Learning from
the 3G Experience in Europe, 3 INFO 5 (2001); Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, To-
wards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53
(1999).
11 [Lesser Developed Countries ("LDCs")] and the developed nations
hold fundamentally different beliefs as to the scarcity of usable electro-
magnetic spectrum. Developed countries maintain that electromagnetic
spectrum, although a finite natural resource, is sufficient in supply to ful-
fill worldwide demand, provided it is used in an efficient, high utility,
technologically advanced manner. LDCs maintain that electromagnetic
spectrum is a scarce natural resource, inequitably distributed in a manner
favoring established use.
William Kummel, Spectrum Bids, Bets, and Budgets: Seeking an Optimal Allocation
and Assignment Process for Domestic Commercial Electromagnetic Spectrum Products,
Services, and Technology, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 511, 540 (1996).
12 "It can also be expected that in future the principles of public service and
global public interest in all forms of telecommunications, including satellite tele-
communication, would be further compromised. Some countries, mainly the poor
and developing ones, would be denied a significant amount of benefits of tele-
communication satellite technology." Ram S. Jakhu, Safeguarding the Concept of
Public Service and the Global Public Interest in Telecommunications, 5 SING. J. INT' L &
COMP. L. 71, 100 (2001).
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Likewise, these considerations support the view that government
agencies should not have to compete against commercial ventures
for spectrum.
Equity considerations notwithstanding, marketplace remedies
have gained favor among the ranks of both policymakers and aca-
demics. Current debates take as a foregone conclusion the public
benefits of competitive bidding, and instead concentrate on fine-
tuning the process, including the possibility of extending its
reach.13 For example, the United States Federal Communications
Commission's Spectrum Policy Task Force has recommended the
possible use of competitive bidding "to resolve mutually exclusive
applications for global and international satellite services" 14 not-
withstanding a law that prohibits such a practice.15
1.2. Cross-Border Spectrum and Satellite Uses Amplify Equity Con-
cerns
Equity concerns become more compelling when users in two or
more nations have to share radiocommunications resources and
coordinate uses. The limitations of physics, politics, jurisdiction,
and international treaties complicate the process for sharing. They
refute the simple assumption of some economists that shared
global radiocommunication resources are identical to real estate
such that treaties between governments could "extend the prop-
erty rights system.., into the international realm."16 Many radio
13 See, e.g., EVAN KWEREL & JOHN WILLIAMS, A PROPOSAL FOR A RAPID
TRANSrrION TO MARKET ALLOCATION OF SPECTRUM, FCC Working Paper No. 38
(2002) (proposing a methodology for efficiently restructuring a large amount of
encumbered spectrum), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public
/attachmatch/DOC-228552A1.pdf; Joseph M. Ward, Comment, Secondary Markets
in Spectrum: Making Spectrum Policy as Flexible as the Spectrum Market it Must Foster,
10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 103 (2001) (following the evolution of spectrum policy
in the context of assignments and transfers).
14 Spectrum Policy Task Force, Federal Communications Commission, Re-
port, ET Docket No. 02-135 at 42 (2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov
/edocs.public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1.doc.
15 [The FCC] shall not have the authority to assign by competitive bid-
ding orbital locations or spectrum used for the provision of international
or global satellite communications services. The President shall oppose
in the International Telecommunication Union and in other bilateral and
multilateral fora any assignment by competitive bidding of orbital loca-
tions or spectrum used for the provision of such services.
International Telecommunications Act, P.L. 106-180,114 Stat. 48 (2000).
16 White, supra note 8, at 37.
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services provide long-range communications, and most satellites
have signal coverage "footprints" that span entire regions. Ac-
cordingly, no single nation or private venture can act unilaterally
because most nations have committed to a multilateral approach
for shared access to radiocommunications resources. Any decision
by one nation to launch a communications satellite or to activate a
new radiocommunications facility can have a direct and potentially
adverse impact on other nations, particularly ones nearby.
Simply analogizing radiocommunications resources to real es-
tate ignores the fact that privatizing spectrum can foreclose access
rights of others, including citizens in nearby countries. A nation
can recognize private property ownership rights and can establish
binding and effective rules for the buying and selling of real estate
within the country. However, such a marketplace system for ra-
diocommunications resources would involve the application of
rules on an extraterritorial, cross-border basis.
One can appreciate the attractiveness of privatizing radiocom-
munications. Developed and developing countries alike stand to
benefit financially from a one-time infusion of cash into their na-
tional treasury when converting freely-licensed spectrum grants to
a competitive bidding mechanism such as auctions. However,
long-term complications and deficiencies in privatization of global
radiocommunications resources offset much of the near-term gain,
especially for the trafficking in satellite orbital slots. Developing
nations stand to lose more from a commercialized market than
from one characterized by multilateral coordination, compromise,
and consensus building.
1.3. International Governance Mechanisms
When it comes to radio spectrum and satellite orbital slots, na-
tions collectively and individually have rejected either an absolute
market-driven or an equity-driven model for allocating, register-
ing, and coordinating usage. On a multilateral basis, nations look
to a specialized agency of the United Nations, the International
Telecommunication Union ("ITU"), to erect and administer
mechanisms for conflict avoidance and resolution. While lacking
an enforcement mechanism, the ITU provides a forum for the ven-
tilation of both efficiency and equity arguments.
ITU decisions typically occur without a formal vote because the
forum seeks to build a consensus. Nations often agree to a single
spectrum allocation or technical standard based on enlightened
[24:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss2/1
20031 GLOBAL RADIOCOMMUNICATION RESOURCES
self-interest- i.e., the sense that uniformity will reduce operating
costs, speed commercial rollout of new technologies, and reduce
confusion. When nations fail to reach a consensus at the ITU,
manufacturers may have to produce multiple equipment product
lines and consumers may incur higher costs -e.g., no single cellu-
lar telephone will function at all locations.
The ITU has established shared "rules of the road" in exchange
for the relinquishment of some degree of national sovereignty and
self-determination. Nations participating in the ITU agree to par-
ticipate in a spectrum allocation process that identifies specific uses
for particular portions of the radio spectrum. Nations agree to reg-
ister their spectrum and satellite orbital slot requirements on an as-
needed basis as well. The ITU model provides an effective admin-
istrative vehicle to register spectrum and orbital slot usage and to
mediate disputes. However, it cannot prevent "warehousing" of
spectrum-i.e., registering unneeded uses that has the effect of
foreclosing others, who have near-term requirements, from achiev-
ing conflict-free registrations. In addition, the ITU administrative
process cannot foreclose attempts to register "paper satellites" -
i.e., filing for the registration of orbital slots for satellites with no
realistic probability of launch.17
Warehousing of spectrum and filing paper satellite registration
applications have the doubly harmful effect of: 1) blocking pro-
ductive use by others with near-term needs; and 2) thwarting later-
in-time registration by developing nations whose requirements
and ability to finance usage typically arise after developed nations
already have enjoyed first choice opportunities. Only on rare occa-
sions has the ITU deviated from a "first filed, first registered"
model by reserving spectrum and orbital slots for developing na-
tions. 8
17 For background on the ITU satellite orbital slot registration process and the
administrative difficulties resulting from paper satellite registration filings, see
Albert N. Delzeit & Robert F. Beal, The Vulnerability of the Pacific Rim Orbital Spec-
trum Under International Space Law, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 69 (1996); Jannat C.
Thompson, Space For Rent: The International Telecommunications Union, Space Law,
and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing, 62 J. AIR L. & CoM. 279 (1996); Henry Wong, Comment,
The Paper "Satellite" Chase: The ITU Prepares for its Final Exam in Resolution 18, 63 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 849 (1998).
18 The most successful application of equity principles to the geostation-
ary orbit arose out of negotiations during the sessions of the Space World
Administrative Radiocommunications Conference held in 1985 and 1988.
The result was a compromise that produced a hybrid system which com-
bined the "first come, first served" system with an a priori allotment sys-
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On occasion, developing countries have resorted to unilateral
"self-help" strategies to compensate for their inferior access and,
perhaps, in retaliation to the superior access enjoyed by developed
nations. Such strategies have included the unilateral claim by sev-
eral equatorial countries to national ownership of satellite orbital
slots situated directly above them.19 However, no nation has suc-
cessfully extracted payment for relinquishing unneeded and finan-
cially unviable ITU registrations of frequencies. A possible solu-
tion to the inferior, later-in-time access problem encountered by
developing nations may lie in developing ways to aggregate funds
and telecommunications service demand so that spectrum and or-
bital slot registrations may proceed earlier than if a single nation
sought to construct and operate a costly network.20 Another poten-
tial remedy lies in requiring wealthy nations to use new techno-
logical tools that can free up spectrum for use by developing na-
tions unable to afford such cutting-edge innovations.
1.4. Pooling Investment in International Satellites to Promote Access
Multilateralism has also worked to promote widespread access
to satellite technology, including the opportunities for developing
nations to participate in the ownership and management of a
global satellite carrier. The pooling of investment among nations
helped spread technological and financial risk across a larger
group of participants. It also expedited the use of satellite technol-
tern. Under the plan, each ITU Member was granted an allotment con-
sisting of a nominal orbital position which represented a center point
around which to base a maximum ten degree arc on the geostationary or-
bit, eight hundred megahertz of bandwidth, and a designated service
area roughly equivalent to each Member's terrestrial borders. The allot-
ments should not be confused with actual reserved assignments of posi-
tions and frequencies for fixed satellite service. They more closely re-
semble a right of coordination priority. The actual positions and
frequencies remain available for use under the traditional allocation
process; it is only when a Member begins the process of notification that
the allotment plan becomes a factor in the distribution process.
Roberts, supra note 7, at 1128.
19 Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries of Dec. 3, 1976,
available at http://www.nasda.go.jp/lib/space-law/chapter22/2-2-1-2_e.html.
20 See, e.g., Lee Berger, Proposed Legal Structure for the Silksat Satellite Consor-
tium: A Regional Intergovernmental Organization to Improve Telecommunications Infra-
structure in Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus Region, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
99 (2001) (describing plans for a satellite telecommunications system for the Cen-
tral Asia and Trans-Caucasus region).
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ogy for commercial communications in addition to established
space exploration, defense, and intelligence-gathering missions.
Satellite investment pooling by many nations follows a coop-
erative model previously used in a number of agricultural applica-
tions. Where one unit of a product has little, if any, difference with
another unit, this fungible characteristic supports aggregation by
numerous producers. For example, all the dairy or wheat farmers
in a region can pool their investments and establish a local process-
ing and storage facility for handling all of the farmers' output.
This facility helps the farmers obtain the best possible prices for
their products and also creates the possibility for some degree of
value-added processing, e.g., milling the wheat and pasteurizing
the milk.
Satellite cooperatives aggregated demand and made it possible
to establish a large inventory of capacity. The International Satel-
lite Organization ("INTELSAT"),21 European Satellite Organization
("EUTELSAT"), and International Maritime Satellite Organization
("INMARSAT") helped expedite the commercialization of space
radiocommunications and made it possible for developing nations
to participate with a small initial investment. The satellite coopera-
tives had charters, negotiated on a multilateral, inter-governmental
basis, that emphasized the promotion of world peace and under-
standing through widespread access and use of satellites. These
cooperatives operated as businesses, but had missions that empha-
sized access and service instead of profit maximization.
The global and regional satellite ownership model helped make
it possible for developing nations to afford satellite network access.
Even the poorest and smallest nations could connect to a global
satellite constellation with a minor investment in the cooperative
through the payment of affordable rates for a small amount of sat-
ellite capacity and installation of one or more earth station trans-
mitting and receiving facilities. However, this model lost much of
its financial and policy support over time. As satellite technology
evolved and as the marketplace for satellite services developed, the
cost of constructing, launching, and operating a satellite network
dropped substantially. Demand for satellite services, particularly
delivery of video content to broadcast and cable television net-
21 For background on the formation of INTELSAT and its privatization see
Alexandra M. Field, INTELSAT at a Crossroads, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1335
(1994); Rob Frieden, Privatization of Satellite Cooperatives: Smothering A Golden
Goose?, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 1001 (1996).
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works, stimulated private entrepreneurs to think they could enter
the market and thrive. The incumbent satellite operators, such as
INTELSAT, sought to thwart such competition on grounds that it
would cause economic harm and hinder the cooperatives' ability to
serve high cost, rural locations, and to facilitate investment and
participation by developing nations.
Over time, the satellite cooperatives acted much like cartels in-
tent on preserving their financial well-being at the expense of oth-
ers. Nations with government or private-carrier investors in satel-
lite cooperatives had executed treaty-like documents, designed to
confer special privileges and immunities, so that the cooperatives
could achieve their mixed business and political mission. This spe-
cial status helped reduce the cost of setting up and operating the
cooperatives, but it also created a semi-diplomatic organization in-
sulated from many marketplace forces. For example, the creators
of INTELSAT sought to ensure that the cooperative would capture
most of the global telecommunications traffic by agreeing not to
authorize separate international satellite operators that collectively
would cause economic harm to the cooperative. Additionally, the
cooperatives and their employees enjoyed special exemptions from
tax and other domestic charges imposed by the nation where the
cooperatives were based and where satellites were bought and
launched.
In the mid-1980s, the United States, followed by other nations,
permitted commercial satellite alternatives. 22 These systems have
achieved marketplace success without adversely affecting the abil-
ity of satellite cooperatives to achieve their mission. Management
of these cooperatives, having failed in their bid to block competi-
tion, turned their attention to finding ways to compete more effec-
tively. In the spirit of "if you can't beat them, join them," the man-
agers of INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT sought to
privatize and to become commercial ventures. 23 Efforts were un-
dertaken to ensure "lifeline" access by nations unlikely to benefit
22 See Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communica-
tions, 101 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1985), modified on reconsideration, 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F)
648 (1986) (establishing regulatory policies to consider application for satellite sys-
tems providing international communications services separate from INTELSAT).
23 See Francis Lyall, On the Privatisation of INTELSAT, 5 SING. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 111 (2001) (describing the conversion of INTELSAT from an intergovernmental
organization into a private company).
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from competitive satellite markets.24 However, too little time has
passed to confirm that spun-off and commercialized former coop-
eratives will not further handicap developing nations and worsen
the gap between nations in terms of access to telecommunications
and information-processing services. At the very least, developing
nations need to voice their concerns about prospective radiocom-
munications resource requirements and seek compromises with
developed countries.
2. PREFERENCES, POWER, AND POLICYMAKING
To understand the reasons behind the push for market resource
allocation alternatives, one should consider the strengths and
weaknesses in the incumbent ITU and satellite cooperative models.
At their best, these models have promoted timely access to new
technologies and services by users in developing nations, often
provided helpful conflict avoidance and resolution services, and
promoted shared "rules of the road" that reduced cost, enhanced
operational efficiency, and gave a voice to developing nations. At
their worst, these models have forestalled introduction of new
technologies and services, helped extend developed-nation domi-
nation of spectrum and orbital slots, and failed to prevent gaming
and manipulation of the registration process.
2.1. International Telecommunication Union
The ITU strives to lend its "good offices" for resolving issues
pertaining to spectrum use, telecommunications policies, stan-
dards, and development. 25 However, the ITU can shape uniform
24 For example, the United States Congress enacted the Open-Market Reor-
ganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act, P.L. 106-
80 (2000), to ensure that privatized cooperatives do not have the ability to leverage
their previous status to secure anticompetitive advantages, and to ensure a small
residual organization continues to provide core, lifeline services to developing na-
tions, including ones lacking access to submarine cable capacity. For access to the
legislative history on the ORBIT Act, see Bill Summary and Status for the 106th
Congress, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:SNO0376: I TOM:/
bss/dl06query.html.
25 For background on the ITU organization structure and history, see George
A. Codding, Jr., The International Telecommunications Union: 130 Years of Telecom-
munications Regulation, 23 DEr_.v. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 501 (1995); Francis Lyall, The
International Telecommunication Union and Development, 22 J. SPACE L. 23 (1994);
Harold M. White, Jr. & Rita Lauria, The Impact of New Communication Technologies
on International Telecommunication Law and Policy: Cyberspace and the Restructuring
of the International Telecommunication Union, 32 CAL. W. L. REv. 1 (1995).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
operational rules and register interference-free spectrum uses if
and only if all nations recognize its legitimacy and comply with its
regulations, policies, and recommendations. At various times both
developed and developing nations have expressed frustration with
the pace, quality, and effectiveness of ITU decision-making.26
Some developing nations have claimed that the developed nations
unfairly set the policymaking agenda by fully staffing the numer-
ous voluntary study groups and other forums that pose questions,
provide answers, and recommend rules.27 Stakeholders in devel-
oped nations complain about the slow pace of decision-making
and the apparent inability of the ITU to respond quickly to
changed circumstances -for example, the need to revise rules and
to allow shared use of spectrum when technological innovations
make it easier to do so without harmful interference.
The ITU strives to balance often conflicting interests in efficient
use of spectrum and satellite orbital slots on one hand, and in pro-
moting equity concerns, such as promoting access by developing
countries, on the other hand. Article 44 of the ITU Constitution
states that:
Members shall endeavour to limit the number of frequen-
cies and the spectrum used to the minimum essential to
provide in a satisfactory manner the necessary services. To
that end, they shall endeavour to apply the latest technical
advances as soon as possible.
26 Although a lot has already been achieved in the right direction by the
ITU-which "can reform", as history has demonstrated over decades
many think nevertheless that even more needs to be done. This reform
process is, therefore, still ongoing and new reform proposals will in all
likelihood again be on the table ....
Alfons A.E. Noll, The ITU in the 21st Century, 5 SING. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 63, 68-69
(2001).
27 North-South debates concerning access to information and equitable
allocation of spectrum have often mired the international telecommunica-
tions negotiations of the last two decades. Many believed that the infor-
mation and communications gaps between the North and South could be
bridged only by normative restructuring schemes under the rubric of the
New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO).
J.M. Spectar, Bridging the Global Digital Divide: Frameworks for Access and the World
Wireless Web, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 57 (2000).
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In using frequency bands for radio services, Members shall
bear in mind that radio frequencies and the geostationary-
satellite orbit are limited natural resources and that they
must be used rationally, efficiently and economically, in
conformity with the provisions of the Radio Regulations, so
that countries or groups of countries may have equitable
access to both, taking into account the special needs of the
developing countries and the geographical situation of par-
ticular countries. 28
The ITU has established an administrative process for allocat-
ing spectrum uses and for registering a nation's use of both spec-
trum and satellite orbital slots. 29 Generally the ITU process offers
first-filed, first-in-priority recognition. Because the ITU lacks an
enforcement mechanism, it can only legitimize, rather than guaran-
tee, a spectrum use and orbital slot registration. Likewise, the ITU,
in compliance with other treaties executed under the auspices of
the United Nations, cannot provide a mechanism for national ap-
propriation or ownership of resources located in outer space, such
as satellite orbital slots. 30 These twin limitations severely constrain
the flexibility and effectiveness of the ITU.
The ITU can provide effective conflict avoidance and resolution
services if member nations agree to comply with its recommenda-
tions and findings, which do not have the force of a treaty obliga-
tion.31 Likewise, the ITU cannot readily discipline member nations
from "papering" the registration system with spectrum and satel-
lite registrations designed to foreclose uses by operators in other
nations, extract payments from others with more immediate needs,
28 ITU Constitution, supra note 6, ch. VII, art. 44.
29 For background on the ITU spectrum allocation and satellite orbital slot
registration process, see FRIEDEN, supra note 2, ch. 6.
30 In short, the Outer Space Treaty sets forth the most fundamental prin-
ciples of space law, including that the exploration and use of outer space
shall be for the benefit of all mankind, that outer space is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, and that each State party
shall authorize, supervise, and be responsible for the space activities of its
nationals.
Franceska 0. Schroeder, The U.N. Treaties on Outer Space and Their Effect on Space
Business, 16 AIR & SPACE LAW. 8 (2002).
31 Only the ITU Constitution and Convention have the force of a treaty.
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or secure priority future access based on the possibility of a spec-
trum need.
Few observers would dispute that the ITU spectrum and or-
bital slot management process creates the potential for congestion
in spectrum and orbital slot usage. Much of the potential for inter-
ference arises from speculative paper filings of phantom spectrum
and satellite use proposals that lock up and warehouse currently
unneeded spectrum and orbital slots. The ITU largely lacks "due
diligence" procedures that would require applicants to demon-
strate timely progress toward the actual launch of a satellite and to
pay for the costs incurred by the ITU to process applications and
coordinate among existing and prospective registrants.32 Currently
the ITU cannot readily distinguish real and legitimate filings from
speculative and unrealistic ones.33
Nevertheless, the process has muddled through with relatively
rare instances of actual interfering spectrum uses by terrestrial or
satellite uses. Even with a relatively successful record, the ITU reg-
istration process has frustrated stakeholders in light of the time it
takes and the use of a first-filed, first-registered method that places
a premium on when a nation files for a spectrum or orbital slot use.
National governments and private enterprises recognize the ad-
vantage in commencing the ITU registration process early and of-
32 For a critique of the current registration process and a reform proposal, see
Captain Roscoe M. Moore, III, Business-Driven Negotiations for Satellite System Co-
ordination: Reforming the International Telecommunication Union to Increase Commer-
dally Oriented Negotiations over Scarce Frequency Spectrum, 65 J. AIR L. & CoM. 51
(1999).
33 The ITU recognizes the problem, but so far only non-binding resolutions
have proposed the imposition of more burdensome due diligence requirements
coupled with higher fees to cover the Cost of coordinating possibly interfering
uses. "The problem of 'paper satellites' has been recognized for years, however,
satellite operators have been reluctant to pay processing fees and some develop-
ing countries argue that fees contravene the international principles of fair and
equitable access to orbital slots and the frequency spectrum that governs them."
Press Release, ITU, Scrambling for Space in Space: ITU Plenipotentiary to Tackle
'Paper Satellite' Problem (Sept. 16, 2002), available at http://www, itu.int/
newsarchive/press_releases/2002/21.htm. See also International Telecommuni-
cation Union, Plenipotentiary Conference (Minneapolis, 1998) [hereinafter Pleni-
potentiary Conference], Res. 86, Coordination and Notification Procedures for
Satellite Networks (seeking simplification and cost savings in the registration
process for satellite networks spectrum use), prior version available at
http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/basic-texts/resolutions/res86.html; Res. 88, Proc-
essing Charges for Satellite Network Filings and Administrative Procedures (rec-
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ten. Developing nations typically lack the resources and where-
withal to act early, making it all the more difficult for them to
achieve success for later-in-time applications.
To compensate for developing nations' comparatively inferior
ability to win in a filing race, various equity-based equalizing pro-
posals and self-help strategies have surfaced. The ITU has estab-
lished a limited alternative to the first-in-time, first-in-right (a pos-
teriori) registration. When allocating additional spectrum for
satellite services, the ITU decided to accord each member nation
priority access to at least one orbital slot.34 This a priori system
provides a preferred access opportunity, but provides neither an
orbital slot registration nor a legal right. As well, this process may
emphasize equity at the expense of efficiency, particularly if a de-
veloping nation claims priority access to an orbital slot, despite
having no practical capability to finance the construction, launch,
and operation of a satellite within the seven-year timetable estab-
lished by the ITU.35 Having qualified for a legitimate, preferred
access opportunity, a developing nation might foreclose, or at least
delay, the use of an orbital slot by a developed nation ready and
able to use the orbital slot immediately.
2.2. The Satellite Cooperative Model
While the ITU struggles to maintain its legitimacy and rele-
vancy, the satellite cooperative model has been overtaken by sub-
stantial technological innovations and changed commercial cir-
cumstances. Technological innovations have reduced the cost and
increased competition in satellite manufacture and launch. While
it made sense to pool risk and investment in the initial migration
from space exploration to commercial use, a robust, competitive
satellite industry has evolved. Concerns about making it possible
for developing nations to access satellite technology have abated in
34 An a priori system is a planned, or engineered, system in which the
ITU allots a "nominal" orbital slot with a certain arc or a portion of the
GSO to each member state. When a provider wishes to use a nominal
slot, it must seek assignment from the member country. If the country
makes the assignment to the service provider, the nominal position may
be adjusted to a real position within the arc.
Adrian Copiz, Scarcity in Space: The International Regulation of Satellites, 10
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 207,215-16 (2002).
35 ITU Radio Regulation 1042 creates a five-year timetable within which a sat-
ellite must become operational. ITU Radio Regulation 1550 provides a two-year
extension of time.
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view of market entry by private satellite ventures and a larger set
of national or regional satellite options.
The cooperative model helped foreclose early satellite orbital
slot access disputes because nations collectively invested in a
global constellation of satellites instead of launching their own.
36
This model helped expedite the development of a satellite alterna-
tive to submarine cables by ensuring widespread and geographi-
cally dispersed use of satellites, thereby fully exploiting the wide
geographical coverage of a satellite located in a geostationary orbit
22,300 miles above earth. The proliferation of satellite access op-
tions has eliminated the need for investment pooling, but has
worsened congestion in the geostationary satellite orbital arc.
The satellite cooperative model now has diminished signifi-
cance, both because management of the cooperatives sought a
more flexible environment and because an increasing number of
nations considered it prudent to authorize private competitive al-
ternatives.37 A small residual International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization continues to satisfy INTELSAT's previous
treaty-based commitments to promote "world peace and under-
standing" 38 through widespread international satellite ownership
and access opportunities. This core service mission may become
more difficult if the substantially streamlined INTELSAT encoun-
36 INTELSAT functioned as a "financial cooperative." Each Signatory
made capital contributions and received repayment and compensation
proportional to the amount invested, in accordance with a schedule de-
termined by the Board of Governors. Though capital contributions dif-
fered in size, any user paid the same rate for each type of service. The
Meeting of Signatories fixed rates for all services universally, creating the
economic effect of holding down prices for services in the developing
world (where sparse satellite services would normally be more expen-
sive) and raising them higher in the developed world (where, because of
more competition and supply, rates would otherwise be less expensive).
Berger, supra note 20, at 112-13.
37 For more extensive analysis of INTELSAT's privatization, see Frieden, su-
pra note 21; Lyall, supra note 23; Henry Wong, 2001: A Space Legislation Odyssey - A
Proposed Model for Reforming the Intergovernmental Satellite Organizations, 48 AM. U.
L. REV. 547 (1998).
38 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Or-
ganization "INTELSAT", Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3814. The FCC has ap-
proved INTELSAT's privatization and a public offering of stock will occur.
INTELSAT LLC, 15 F.C.C.R. 15,460, 15,461-62 (2000). See also FCC Report to Con-
gress as Required by the Orbit Act, 16 F.C.C.R. 12,810 (2001); FCC 02-170, 17
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ters difficulty in registering future orbital slot requirements and in
financing satellites.
2.3. Some Self-Help Strategies Mimic Private Auctions
The ITU has refrained from allowing member nations and their
public or private ventures to negotiate financial inducements as a
way to resolve interference and access conflicts. Nevertheless, one
should consider whether such a mechanism might work even un-
der the auspices of the ITU, particularly in light of instances where
the lack of such a forum has generated costs and delays a stake-
holder might gladly pay to remove. Absent a legitimate and cen-
tral forum, which can consider monetary inducements to resolve
conflicts, some parties have sought financial compensation on a
unilateral basis by offering to transfer or withdraw registrations.
Others have used the ITU registration services of nations offering
"flags of convenience." Rather than join the lengthy queue of reg-
istration requests from a developed nation, such as the United
States, an incumbent or prospective satellite operator might seek
expedited or preferential treatment by seeking registration from a
developing country with no backlog.
2.4. Paper Satellites and Nuisance Payments
Paper satellite filings provide an example of self-help retalia-
tion against the real or perceived inequity in the ITU administra-
tive process. Nations lacking the commercial demand or financial
resources to construct, launch, and operate a satellite network nev-
ertheless can exploit the ITU orbital slot registration system to ex-
tract compensation, or at least to vent their frustration by causing
processing delays. For example, between 1988 and 1990 the nation
of Tonga attempted to register sixteen orbital slots. 39 The princi-
39 From 1988 to 1990, when Tonga made the filings on behalf of Friendly
Islands Communications ("Tongasat"), the ITU system permitted a coun-
try to register a position for up to nine years before a satellite was
launched. Tonga's action "outraged" the international community be-
cause it "lacked a genuine need" for so many orbital allotments in the Pa-
cific Rim portion of the GSO. Tonga eventually withdrew its request for
ten of the sixteen allotments, and, in 1991, it acquired six allotments. But,
Tongasat further angered the international community by leasing one al-
lotment to Unicom, a Colorado company, and auctioning off the remain-
ing five allotments ....
Copiz, supra note 34, at 208.
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pals of Tongasat, the private venture for which the Tonga govern-
ment filed the satellite registration applications, made several pub-
licized overtures to incumbent satellite operators offering to relin-
quish some or all of the attempted registrations in exchange for
financial compensation. One could easily infer that the consultant
advising Tonga's government knew that the ITU registration proc-
ess lacked sufficient financial and procedural prerequisites, due
diligence requirements, and benchmarking that might have sty-
mied paper applications. Only recently has the ITU considered
imposing registration fees to compensate it for the costs incurred in
processing a proposed orbital slot registration.40 The ITU still lacks
adequate due diligence standards or a timetable of deliverables
that would require prospective registrants to demonstrate progress
toward a timely launch. Absent these safeguards, a nation with
absolutely no ability to launch dozens of satellites, or even one, still
could have representatives claim a right to coordinate the future
interference-free operation of these paper satellites with existing
and future satellites operating in the region.
Arguably, the instigators of Tonga's satellite registrations had a
mind to create a private auction. As a sovereign nation and mem-
ber of the ITU, Tonga had the right to use the registration services
of the ITU. While guilty of seeking to register satellites for which it
practically never would launch, the nation of Tonga violated only
the spirit of the satellite orbital slot registration procedures. Under
current conditions, it would take only a few more paper satellite
registration applications for the ITU administrative process to im-
plode. However, as the first mover in this strategy, Tonga staked
out orbital slot claims and in effect tried to create a market to be
bought out of these claims. In view of Tonga's efforts to
"monetize" its orbital stake claims, one can anticipate future sce-
narios where more nations might try to extract sizeable nuisance
payments, or perhaps free or discounted satellite capacity in ex-
change for abandoning their claims. ITU Member nations includ-
ing Gibraltar and Papua New Guinea have offered to handle the
ITU registration process for satellite network proposals based in
the United States but designed to provide services to many nations
including the sponsoring registrant.
2.5. Defects in the ITU Administrative Process
40 See Plenipotentiary Conference, supra note 33, at Res. 86 and 88.
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In addition to encouraging self-help and trafficking, the current
ITU spectrum and orbital slot registration process has resulted in
inefficient use of global resources, delay, and higher costs. The
ITU limits flexibility and speed of access by imposing an interna-
tional template on spectrum uses and registration. The ITU uses a
block allocation method for allocating spectrum that subdivides
usable spectrum into service-specific slivers of priority use. While
the international allocation constitutes a recommendation without
the force of a treaty, and nations may opt out by taking a "reserva-
tion" to any specific allocation, most domestic regulatory agencies
implement the ITU consensus decision.41
Allocating spectrum in blocks limits user flexibility, but a
global consensus on uses theoretically can reduce costs, promote
single equipment production lines, enhance connectivity across
borders, and support single or compatible operating standards. In
economic terms, consensus spectrum allocations promote positive
network externalities 42 in terms of cross-border compatibility of
equipment and services. For example, most nations have agreed to
the consensus spectrum allocation for satellite frequencies. This
means that all nations illuminated by a satellite footprint can access
the same satellite having agreed on what frequencies the satellite
will operate and what technical parameters transmitting and re-
ceiving earth stations will use. When nations fail to reach such
consensus, consumers face equipment and operating frequency in-
compatibility as has occurred with cellular radiotelephone service.
If the nations of the world had agreed on a single spectrum alloca-
tion for cellular radio service, there might have evolved a single
transmission standard so that a single transceiver could operate
throughout the world.
While spectrum block allocations can promote the accrual of
positive network externalities, ironically they also can frustrate
progress achieved through technological innovations. For exam-
ple, transceiver miniaturization now makes it possible to use the
41 See, e.g., The Establishment of Policies and Service Rules for the Non-
Geostationary Satellite Orbit, Fixed Satellite Service in the Ku-Band, Report and
Order, III Docket No. 01-96, 17 F.C.C.R. 7841 (2002) (implementing co-frequency
sharing arrangements among different types of satellite operators consistent with
policies adopted by the ITU's 2000 World Radiocommunication Conference).
42 A network externality arises when a good becomes more valuable to a user
if more users adopt the same good or compatible ones. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSMIAL ORGANIZATION 405 (1992). See also Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. EcoN. REV. 424 (1985).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
same satellite radiotelephone when on land, in an aircraft, and on
the high seas. However, before the onset of this innovation, the
ITU established separate spectrum allocations for land mobile,
aeronautical, and maritime satellite mobile services based on the
then appropriate assumption that satellite terminals would remain
fixed in only one of the three different locations. The ITU has not
yet fully acknowledged the newly achieved ability to use a satellite
handset across the three different operating environments thereby
maintaining a now unnecessary limitation on the range of frequen-
cies available.
2.6. Spectrum Management Initiatives
After decades of effort,43 economists have generated an increas-
ingly positive reception among legislators and policymakers to as-
sertions that market forces can apply to the allocation and use of
radio spectrum. Economists consider spectrum no different from
real estate and other types of property:
Land is finite; the same is true of spectrum. Productive
land is "scarce"; the same is true of spectrum. Different
types of land are inherently better suited for different uses;
the same is true of spectrum. Technological change can
improve the efficiency of the use of land; the same is true of
spectrum. Technological change can expand the amount of
land that is considered usable and productive; the same is
true of spectrum. Technological change can alter the uses
to which land should economically be devoted; the same is
true of spectrum. Changing economic demands (often in-
43 Economists have long argued that market-driven allocation and use of
spectrum serves efficiency and welfare-enhancing goals. See, e.g., Ronald Coase,
The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959) (discussing the evo-
lution of the FCC and its powers); Cramton, supra note 10; Arthur S. DeVany, et
al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-
Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1499 (1969) (discussing the legal, eco-
nomic, and engineering issues raised by the creation of a property system in the
electromagnetic spectrum); Thomas W. Hazlett, supra note 10; Glen 0. Robinson,
Spectrum Property Law 101, 41 J.L. & ECON. 609 (1998); Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey
S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50
FED. COMM. L.J. 87 (1997) (addressing spectrum policy questions); David Salant,
Auctions and Regulation: Reengineering of Regulatory Mechanisms, 17 J. REG. ECON.
195 (2000) (focusing on spectrum auctions); Douglas W. Webbink, Radio Licenses
and Frequency Spectrum Use Property Rights, 9 COMM. & THE L. 3 (1987) (noting
property rights within the frequency spectrum).
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tertwined with technological change) can alter the efficient
uses to which land should be put; the same is true of spec-
trum. Some uses of land may interfere with neighboring
uses of land; the same is true of spectrum.44
Economists quite properly recognize the inefficiency in non-
market allocation mechanisms, such as that exercised by domestic
regulators such as the Federal Communications Commission in
concert with the multilateral, ITU block allocation process.45
Economists have persuasively argued that the current "regulatory
system.., systematically suppress[es] competitive entry, block[s]
efficient spectrum use, and protect[s] obsolete technologies from
innovate challenge." 46 The block allocation method established by
the ITU and implemented domestically by national regulatory
agencies establishes a top-down, lock-step symmetry at the ex-
pense of user flexibility, particularly when technological innova-
tions enhance the potential for non-interfering, but different types
of services using the same spectrum. Because the allocation proc-
ess coupled with licensing users tends to foreclose timely adjust-
ments, incumbent users benefit from such inertia. While having
nothing more than a spectrum operating permit, incumbents act as
though their licenses confer a right to use assigned spectrum in
perpetuity, without having to share and without having to pay for
the privilege.
National regulatory agencies justify their intervention as neces-
sary to serve the public interest, to prevent chaotic interference,
and to compensate for inequity in market resource allocation. For
example, the public interest mandate can justify regulatory inter-
vention to promote localism, a policy initiative aiming to achieve
widespread geographical coverage of broadcast radio and televi-
sion stations, particularly in rural areas, at the expense of reducing
the total number of broadcast outlets, particularly in urban areas.
44 White, supra note 8, at 21.
45 "The public interest standard gives rise to a regulatory architecture that is
generally hostile to efficiency. Consumer interests are dependably eclipsed by
special interests." Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth
Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke":
An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 403 (2001) [herein-
after Hazlett, The Wireless Craze]. "[Sipectrum regulation is not mandated to ad-
vance consumer welfare, and the structure yielded by the public interest standard
protects incumbent licensees at the expense of efficiency." Id. at 405.
46 Id. at 452.
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The public interest mandate also justifies a variety of behavior-
shaping regulations ostensibly designed to accrue public benefits
from the private use of spectrum selected from a larger pool of ap-
plicants. Put another way, public interest regulations impose a
quantifiable tax on spectrum use in the sense that users may have
to modify their spectrum use in ways that reduce the value of the
spectrum to them, but perhaps increase the value to public benefi-
ciaries and consumers of the services provided. A commercial
television broadcaster might air public affairs programming-e.g.,
roundtable political discussions, fully recognizing that audience
ratings will decline as comparatively fewer viewers prefer such
content.
National regulatory agencies also justify their intervention on
the perceived need to serve as a "traffic cop of the airwaves." 47 Un-
til recently, regulators rejected the adaptation of real estate zoning
laws for spectrum management as insufficient to protect the na-
tional interest and to serve social objectives. Regulators also have
insulated government users, including the defense, intelligence-
gathering, antiterrorism, and public safety agencies, from having to
compete and pay for spectrum. Many regulators initially objected
to a one-time national "clearance sale" of valuable national re-
sources, particularly in light of the fact that a property conveyance
mechanism would vest ownership in wealthy individuals or cor-
porations who would have little interest in equity concerns.
Officials in some national regulatory agencies have character-
ized the shortcomings in spectrum ownership as market failure.
This concept views market resource allocation as unable to ac-
commodate societal concerns such as promoting access by the poor
and the politically unconnected and serving market-countervailing
objectives that would not maximize profits, but might promote
public policy objectives such as education, national defense, home-
land security, and public safety.
2.7. Competitive Bidding
Notwithstanding long-term opposition, governments in both
developed and developing countries have authorized competitive
bidding for select portions of radio spectrum, particularly that allo-
47 "[T]ransmission interference has been considered fundamental and has
provided the tried-and-true justification for the rejection of explicit property
rights and for the adoption of a system of Federal stewardship and all-
encompassing regulation." White, supra note 8, at 21.
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cated for domestic mobile telephone services.48 Generally these
spectrum auctions confer an exclusive operating permit for a size-
able time, but do not constitute a transfer of property ownership
rights. These auctions have generated a substantial financial wind-
fall for governments' treasuries, and certainly extract the previ-
ously hidden public value in government awards of operating
permits.49 When governments grant licenses, "[rjadio spectrum, as
allocated to the license, is used at a price of zero."50 The licensee
captures all of what economists term "rent"-i.e., the stream of
revenues and profits flowing from the use of spectrum as well as
the heightened value that may arise in view of spectrum allocation
decisions that may have created a scarcity of frequencies available
for a particular use. By requiring prospective spectrum users to
vote with their pocketbooks, governments effectively extract the
value of spectrum use that operators previously captured exclu-
sively. In application, the government conducts a public auction
where previously spectrum licensees had the opportunity to con-
duct private auctions when selling their licenses at prices well in
excess of the book value of the tangible assets used to provide ser-
vices using radiocommunications resources.5'
Spectrum auctions parallel other types of competitive bidding
opportunities that governments set up when seeking revenue for
conferring private use of public resources. Governments award
private operating franchises in such diverse areas as oil and natural
gas drilling, hotels and other commercial concessions at national
parks, and animal grazing privileges on public property. In addi-
tion to extracting money for the national treasury, spectrum auc-
tions can reduce delays in the issuance of operating authority.
They should achieve greater efficiency in the use of spectrum as
48 See, e.g., Christopher J. Banks, The Third Generation of Wireless Communica-
tions: The Intersection of Policy, Technology, and Popular Culture, 32 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 585 (2001) (describing wireless systems and regulations of four different
countries); D. Daniel Sokol, The European Mobile 3G UMTS Process: Lessons From
The Spectrum Auctions and Beauty Contests, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 17 (2001) (discussing
auction theory and licensing processes in diverse nations).
49 See Jill Carroll, Airwaves Auction Pulls in $16.68 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29,
2001, at B8 (noting the value of U.S. airwaves); Reuters, Airwaves Sale Sets Record,
$16.86 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2001, at C14 (same).
50 Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note 45, at 457.
51 In the United States, before the FCC imposed anti-trafficking rules, spec-
trum licensees could accrue sizeable profits by quickly selling their operating
permits even without having incurred any expense in the construction of the fa-
cilities needed to provide a service.
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competitive bidding typically confers greater operating flexibility:
winning bidders will provide services designed to maximize the
value of the spectrum and expedite the accrual of revenues needed
to recoup the amount bid at auction. Likewise, winning bidders
may accrue operating efficiencies by aggregating spectrum, within
the limits imposed by spectrum caps to foreclose monopolizing the
market for particular services.5 2
2.8. Technological Remedies to Spectrum Scarcity
Technological innovations also offer ways to reduce the poten-
tial for interference and to promote greater spectrum sharing.
Digital signal processing,53 frequency-agile transceivers, and soft-
ware-managed spectrum use provide unprecedented opportunities
to abate spectrum scarcity and congestion.54 By converting signals
into a coded, digital sequence, which is a format compatible to the
language of computers, engineers provide a way to streamline con-
tent delivery. A compressed digital signal can fit in a smaller
channel thereby making it possible for more content to be transmit-
ted. Frequency-agile radios hop and skip across various frequen-
cies to avoid interference and to accommodate many users. Soft-
ware adds intelligence and computation capabilities to transmitters
and receivers thereby expanding total content output and abating
the potential for interference.
In an environment where virtually unlimited spectrum access
is technologically possible, governments need not micromanage
spectrum use, provided they establish technical standards for the
52 In December, 2001 the FCC decided on a cap on spectrum available to a
single operator providing commercial mobile radio services such as cellular radio-
telephone and personal communications services. See 2000 Biennial Regulatory
Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Commercial Mobile Radio Services, WT
Docket No. 01-14, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 22,668 (2002) (eliminating the
spectrum cap rule effective January 1, 2003 and immediately raising the cap from
45 MHz to 55 MHz in all markets).
53 "Due to advances in digital signal processing and antenna technology,
communications systems and devices are becoming more tolerant of interference
through their ability to sense and adapt to the R[adio] F[requency] environment."
Spectrum Policy Task Force, Federal Communications Commission, Report of the
Interference Protection Working Group 5 (Nov. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/IPWGFinalReport.pdf.
54 "'Frequency-agile technology via software-defined radio technology can be
used to monitor power in spectrum bands and thus determine where channels
might not be used or not available for licensed services due to buildout and de-
ployment or environmental or topological considerations.'" Id. at 12 (quoting
comments filed by Personal Telecom Tech, Inc.).
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equipment and the transmission standards used by radio transmit-
ting equipment. This approach considers spectrum a shared
"commons" much like a public park where private ownership and
property rights need not exist.55
On a limited basis, governments have permitted this "spectrum
commons" approach by allocating spectrum for low-powered,
unlicensed use. Examples in the United States include citizens
band radio,56 a higher frequency alternative known as the Family
Radio Service,5 7 a variety of unlicensed services under Part 15 of
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") Rules, includ-
ing baby monitors, garage door openers, model airplane control-
lers, and cordless telephones,58 and wideband, wireless data ser-
vices59 including the increasingly popular Wireless Fidelity
("WiFi") alternative to cellular radio and other metered, pay by the
minute, wireless data services.60 Heretofore most spectrum com-
55 For background on the concept of a commons as applied to spectrum use,
see Benkler, supra note 8, at 394; Buck, supra note 8, at 2; Noam, supra note 8, at
768, 778-80.
56 The Commission defines the Citizens Band Radio Service as "a pri-
vate, two-way, short-distance voice communications service for personal
or business activities of the general public." In the CB Radio Service, us-
ers may transmit communications about their personal or business activi-
ties, emergencies, and traveler assistance, but users must limit their
communications to the minimum practicable time.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order, Amendment of the Commission's
Rules Regarding Dedicated Short-Range Communication Services in the 5.850-
5.925 GHz Band (5.9 GHz Band), WT Docket No. 01-90, 2002 WL 31526787 (F.C.C.
Nov. 15, 2002).
57 "The Family Radio Service (FRS) - a private, two-way, very short-distance
voice communications service for facilitating family and group activities." 47
C.F.R. § 95.401(b) (2001).
58 See 47 C.F.R. Part 15 (2001) ("Radio Frequency Devices"); Review of Part 15
and Other Parts of the Commission's Rules, ET Docket 01-278, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 18,205 (2001) (reviewing and updating parts
of the FCC rules including remote frequency devices).
59 See, e.g., Amendment of Part 15 of the Commission's Rules Regarding
Spread Spectrum Devices, ET Docket No. 99-231, Second Report and Order, 17
F.C.C.R. 10,755 (2002) (improving spectrum sharing by unlicensed devices); Revi-
sion of Part 15 of the Commission's Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmis-
sion Systems, ET Docket No. 98-153, Erratum, 17 F.C.C.R. 10,505 (2002) (correcting
errors in original Part 15).
60 Short-range data transmission is device-to-device communication over
short distances, typically via unlicensed spectrum. The three main short-
range data transmission technologies are infrared, Bluetooth, and Wire-
less Fidelity ("WiFi"). Infrared, a well-established technology, is cur-
rently used in some PDAs to allow users to transfer data between two
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mons services quickly became congested, unreliable, and interfer-
ence-ridden as the number of users increased. Some users re-
sponded by illegally increasing their transmission power thereby
increasing the likelihood of harmful interference.
New computationally-intensive spectrum-hopping and code-
sequencing spectrum uses offer the potential for solving "tragedy
of the commons" congestion resulting from overuse. Unlicensed
WiFi usage has become quite popular,61 much to the chagrin of cel-
lular radio and other wireless licensees that paid sizeable sums for
their operating authority. Currently one cannot dismiss the tech-
nological innovations as inadequate or inferior to the property
ownership alternative. However, the potential still exists for
congestion, and technological solutions require the coordination
and use of expensive new technologies.
devices. Infrared is also the technology commonly used in remote con-
trols and requires line-of-sight transmission. Bluetooth enables multi-
point, broadcasting applications, and WiFi enables devices to connect to
wireless local area networks ("WLAN")....
... Bluetooth is a technology used to establish wireless connectivity be-
tween electronic devices that are up to 10 meters apart. Bluetooth allows
users to send signals and transfer data among numerous electronic de-
vices, thus creating a personal area network ("PAN"). Bluetooth uses
unlicensed spectrum in the 2.4 GHz band and transmits data at speeds
close to one Mbps. Bluetooth also uses frequency hopping spread spec-
trum techniques to provide enhanced communications performance and
an initial level of transmission security.
Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Re-
spect to Commercial Mobile Services, Seventh Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 12,985, 13,061
(2002).
61 Another wireless networking technology sharing the 2.4 GHz fre-
quency band with Bluetooth is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers ("IEEE") 802.11b standard, also called WiFi. The 802.11b stan-
dard is used to connect devices to WLANs, and allows a maximum
throughput of 11 Mbps. Analysts have made several predictions about
the growth of the WLAN market and WiFi. Frost & Sullivan predicts that
WLAN industry revenues will reach $884 million by 2002, compared to
$415 million in revenues forecast in 1999. The Dell'Oro Group expects
the WiFi market to grow by 35 percent in 2002. Gartner Group estimates
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2.9. Problems in Competitive Bidding and Technological Congestion
Remedies
Despite their glowing endorsements, spectrum auctions and
technological innovations do not completely remedy the inherent
deficiencies in administrative allocation and licensing spectrum.
Advocates for "propertizing" and "monetizing" spectrum scoff at
lofty, but vague notions of the public interest and national security:
"[t]he 'public interest' with respect to the use of spectrum is a
vague, ill-defined concept. Under the 'public interest' banner the
Congress and the FCC have established far too many protectionist,
anti-competitive, anti-innovative, inflexible, output-limiting regu-
latory regimes." 62 However defective in implementation, serving
the public interest can achieve desirable social outcomes. Put an-
other way, implementation of a marketplace resource allocation
can frustrate efforts to achieve social goals. Additionally, in this
age of heightened concerns about terrorism and national security,
it comes across as rather cavalier 63 to suggest that because every-
thing is scarce, government defense, intelligence gathering, home-
land security, and public safety agencies should pay for spectrum
along with everyone else.64
Advocates for competitive bidding also have to recognize the
mixed record generated so far. Perhaps because governments suc-
cessfully tailored auctions to extract maximum revenues, the out-
comes have included several instances where bidders could not
come up with the full amount, resulting in default and bankruptcy.
Conflicts between bankruptcy and communications law in the
United States 65 have resulted in uncertainty whether the defaulted
62 White, supra note 8, at 35.
63 Under the property rights system... governments would still have
the ability to own and use spectrum parcels in ways that taxpayers felt
were worthwhile, including defense and public safety, public broadcast-
ing, etc. in the same way (and subject to the same constraints) that public
agencies can own and use other forms of property.
Id.
64 "In principal, we think that government users should acquire spectrum at
market prices the same way they acquire other inputs such as oil, real estate, and
computer equipment. Paying market prices for these other inputs does not dimin-
ish the quality of government services." KWEREL & WILLAMS, supra note 13, at 29.
65 When a licensee goes bankrupt, tension arises if the FCC tries to use its
position as a regulator to give it an advantage as a creditor. The question
is whether courts should treat the FCC as a creditor or as a regulator in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings involving electromagnetic spectrum
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spectrum awards remain in the bankruptcy estate, administered by
a court of law, or become available for reauction by the FCC.66
Competitive bidding for spectrum earmarked for third-
generation mobile telephone and high-speed data services has gen-
erated astronomical amounts in the United States and nations in
the European Union. However, a change in the overall market-
place attractiveness of telecommunications and information-
processing ventures has jeopardized the operators' ability to re-
coup amounts bid for spectrum in a timely manner. Spectrum
bidding has so raised debt exposure and risk that traditionally blue
chip incumbent telecommunications ventures, such as British Tele-
com, Deutsche Telekom, AT&T, and France Telecom, have in-
curred significant downgrades in the quality classification of their
debt thereby raising their cost of raising capital. Similarly, the sub-
stantial near-term increase in debt and financial losses has a direct
and substantial impact on the long-term tax liability and payments
made by these firms.
While competitive bidding advocates may emphasize the po-
tential for scale economies in the ability of firms to aggregate spec-
trum, opponents note the likelihood for concentration of owner-
licensees. The FCC's dual role has led the Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits
to reach different and conflicting conclusions regarding the scope of the
FCC's regulatory power in such proceedings.
The courts' efforts to reconcile the FCC's roles are made difficult because
of tension between a primary goal of bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy
Code's deference to governmental units acting in their regulatory capaci-
ties.
Nicholas J. Patterson, The Nature and Scope of the FCC's Regulatory Power in the Wake
of the Nextwave and GWI PCS Cases, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2002).
66 Courts have reached different outcomes in cases presenting similar facts.
The Second Circuit ruled that FCC jurisdiction over spectrum matters was
deemed to predominate. See In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 200
F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that lower courts exceeded their jurisdiction by in
effect intervening in the allocation of radio spectrum licenses, which was within
the FCC's exclusive regulatory jurisdiction); on remand, In re NextWave Pers.
Communications Inc., 244 B.R. 253 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the FCC
waived its right to assert that the debtors' licenses had been cancelled). However,
the D.C. Circuit, addressing identical facts, held that the FCC was subject to its
jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Code. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc.,
v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit sided with the Second Cir-
cuit holding that the bankruptcy and district courts had jurisdiction over the FCC
in a bankruptcy proceeding involving a licensee. In re GWI PCS1, Inc., 230 F.3d
788 (5th Cir. 2000). Because of a conflict between Circuit Courts, the Supreme
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ship and control, particularly if regulators waive or eliminate caps
on the total amount of spectrum a single operator can control.
Spectrum auction advocates note the potential that smaller parcels
of spectrum property might become available on the market just as
large parcels of real estate become subdivided.67 But as regards
spectrum, and in particular highly contested spectrum such as that
allocated for third-generation wireless services, the more likely
outcome would be zealous consolidation of ownership to achieve a
national coverage "footprint." Economists may herald the poten-
tial for an up-to-the-minute "spot" market for spectrum, as well as
a "secondary" resale market,68 but such marketplaces have not yet
developed to any significant degree even for largely fungible min-
utes of long-distance calling capacity, or for broadband links be-
tween nations. Much of the technological innovation supporting a
spectrum commons would have to be in place for a spectrum spot
market to exist, because access would shift between and among
many users in different locations.
The existing spectrum-bidding regime in the United States cou-
pled with corporate mergers and acquisitions and the FCC's near-
term elimination of mobile radio spectrum caps has already
resulted in substantial consolidation and concentration of opera-
tors. Economists might argue that under a property-rights regime,
ample spectrum might be converted to mobile radio use to abate
allocational scarcity created by the previous ITU and national regu-
latory agency regimes. Again, this ease in conversion presupposes
that frequency-agile transceivers and other cutting-edge techno-
logical innovations become standard equipment in the near term.
This assumption might not prove true, particularly where a devel-
67 "[A] system of spectrum property rights would cause spectrum to look
much like real estate: Smaller units of spectrum would be available to anyone who
could pay the market price." White, supra note 8, at 35.
68 The FCC has conditionally endorsed the development of secondary mar-
kets. See Promoting Efficient Use of the Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers
to the Development of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R 24,203 (proposed Nov. 27,
2000) (opening proceedings to examine actions to remove unnecessary regulatory
barriers to the development of more robust secondary markets in radio spectrum
usage rights). See also Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by
Encouraging the Development of Secondary Markets, Policy Statement, 15
F.C.C.R 24,178 (Dec. 1, 2000) (setting forth the FCC's "plans for facilitating secon-
dary markets for radio spectrum that will allow and encourage licensees to make
all or portions of their assigned frequencies and/or service areas available to other
entities and users").
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oped nation lies physically next to one or more developing coun-
tries.
2.10.Flaws in Exporting Domestic Spectrum Policy
Advocates for competitive bidding blithely assume that what
works domestically can extend to international, transborder ser-
vices.69 However, the limitations of physics, politics, jurisdiction,
and international treaties complicate the process and refute the
simple assumption that treaties between governments could "ex-
tend the property rights system.., into the international realm."70
Transborder uses of spectrum require coordination among affected
nations regardless of whether an administrative or property model
applies. In the former case, the ITU has established procedures for
conflict avoidance and resolution. The ITU responds to transbor-
der radio signal penetration by erecting a spectrum registration
process that calls upon nations to relinquish a small degree of sov-
ereignty and independent spectrum use in exchange for reduced
interference, transaction costs, and risk. If a property model were
to replace the administrative model, the ITU or some organization
would have to perform a similar coordination function, using fi-
nancial compensation as the medium for acquiring and relinquish-
ing ownership rights.
Using the ITU or some other body as a spectrum ownership ex-
change involves no less complexity than the current registration
process. Indeed the prospect of securing financial compensation
creates an even greater incentive for any and all nations to claim a
spectrum ownership interest, if only to willingly part with it for
cash. Currently, comparatively few nations claim the right to co-
ordinate their existing or prospective spectrum and orbital slot us-
age with that proposed by a new applicant. The opportunity to
demand and receive "easy money" probably would create incen-
tives for a far greater percentage of nations qualified to demand ei-
ther a coordination right or compensation to do so.
Spectrum auction advocates correctly note that completely do-
mestic spectrum uses would not require coordination with, or
transfer payments to, other nations. However, these advocates
69 "For those spectrum uses that could have international consequences,
some international coordination is needed to minimize interference problems. But
that coordination does not require domestic management of spectrum by the gov-
ernment." White, supra note 8, at 36-37.
70 Id. at 37.
[24:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss2/1
2003] GLOBAL RADIOCOMMUNICATION RESOURCES 321
underestimate the percentage of spectrum uses that can cross bor-
ders. Likewise, they do not seem to recognize that nearly all spec-
trum uses by satellite and all orbital slot occupancies could trigger
claims of potential conflicting uses between nations. Satellite sig-
nal footprints can illuminate as much as one-third of the earth's
surface. Arguably each and every nation lying under that footprint
might have an ownership claim just as they now have a right to
participate in spectrum and orbital slot coordination with a new
usage registrant.
On occasion developing nations have raised equity of access
concerns about the' ITU's first-filed, first-registered spec-
trum/orbital slot registration process. In the mid-1970s, several
equatorial nations attempted to stake an ownership claim to satel-
lite orbital slots lying 22,300 miles overhead.71 While these nations
did not get very far in a clear-cut attempt to declare a portion of
outer space as available for national appropriation, a competitive
bidding scheme would do just that.72 Equatorial nations that failed
in staking an ownership claim, or that grew weary of ITU coordi-
nation lacking a financial payoff, surely would have renewed vigor
if they could extract compensation in exchange for relinquishing
their ownership rights.
Extending the domestic spectrum competitive bidding process
internationally to satellite orbital arc usage has the potential to in-
crease market entry costs substantially. It could also trigger delays
in the launch of new satellites until every country possibly served
by the satellite receives compensation, or otherwise abandons
ownership claims to the spectrum used by the satellite as well as
the orbital slot in which the satellite is parked.73
71 Some states expressed concern that the spacefaring powers will oc-
cupy all of the available slots. The states were concerned that this would
result in the freezing out of any opportunities that the developing states
might have for placing their own satellites into geostationary orbit. The
equatorial states have also asserted that the absence of a commonly-
agreed boundary for the beginning of outer space means that the non-
appropriation language of the Outer Space Treaty is inapplicable to the
geostationary arc.
Weaver, supra note 3, at 228-29.
72 For an examination of whether competitive bidding is lawful despite the
prohibition on national appropriation of outer space resources, see Cahill, supra
note 4, at 231.
73 For a comprehensive argument against satellite spectrum auctions, see
Charles L. Jackson et al., Public Harms Unique to Satellite Spectrum Auctions: A Study
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2.11.Can Economic and Technological Strategies Work for Satellites?
Economists and engineers favoring change in spectrum
management strategies emphasize the potential for greater
competition, flexibility, and availability of spectrum to serve
growing requirements. Combining the concept of property
ownership with technological innovations, advocates for change
herald the possibility of an up-to-the-minute "spot" market for
spectrum able to respond instantaneously to changes in supply
and demand. Such a spot market conceivably could work,
provided that the spectrum on the market is accessible in only one
nation and the technological innovations eliminate the previously
pesky problem of interference. Arguably, a spot market for
spectrum could parallel the developing spot market for
telecommunications capacity 74 and the short-term access to
"occasional use" satellite transponder capacity.75 However, what
theoretically might work domestically has even greater challenges
and limitations internationally.
2.12.Property Ownership Violates the Prohibition on National Appro-
priation of Space Assets
Currently, nations secure priority access to spectrum and satel-
lite orbital arc by successfully maneuvering through the ITU regis-
tration process. Priority access results from the voluntary acquies-
cence of nations without the abdication of possible future access.
As well, such access does not constitute an ownership claim, the
assertion of jurisdiction over a space asset, or a usurpation of an-
Prepared for the Satellite Industry Association (Mar. 18, 1996), available at
http://www.spri.com/pdf/reports/sia/pubharms.pdf.
74 In a recent examination of international telecommunications traffic settle-
ment arrangement, the FCC acknowledged the development of a spot market for
capacity and minutes of use: "[W]e request that commenters provide further in-
formation about the existence of resale 'spot' markets that provide buying and
selling opportunities for capacity on international circuits and how such market
mechanisms may place downward pressure on international termination rates
and consumer calling prices." FCC International Settlements Policy Reform: In-
temational Settlement Rates, #28 (proposed Oct. 10, 2002), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-02285A1.pdf.
75 "Occasional-use television or video service is the provision of satellite
transmission capacity to third parties for their video and associated audio trans-
missions on short notice and for a short duration, usually on one-minute incre-
ments." Section 63.19 Application of Comsat Corporation, For Authority under
Section 214 of the Communications Act to Discontinue the Provision of Occa-
sional-Use Television, Occasional-Use IBS and Part-Time IBS Services, 16 F.C.C.R.
22,396, 22,397 (released Dec. 18, 2001).
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other nation's equal right to secure priority access rights through
the legitimate and recognized procedures administered by the ITU.
The ITU has successfully brokered complex and conflicting satellite
orbital slot claims, albeit with delays and its increasing need for
compensation to shore up its budget. Brokering ownership inter-
ests does not appear to shorten the time to resolution, even as it
raises new complexities.
2.13.Empowerment Opportunities for Developing Nations
Privatization of satellite cooperatives, proliferating private sat-
ellite ventures, technological innovations, calls for market-driven
spectrum ownership, and growing demand challenge the ability of
the ITU to manage shared global telecommunication resources.
Stakeholders grow increasingly impatient with the speed and ef-
fectiveness of ITU conflict avoidance and resolution. Indeed the
ITU has not been able to prevent gaming the system through the
registration of unnecessary paper satellites by nations keen on se-
curing negotiation leverage or cash.
Notwithstanding increasing stress on multilateral policymak-
ing and conflict resolution, new, but costly, technological innova-
tions offer ways to abate spectrum congestion and interference.
Digital transmissions can be compressed and coded in ways that
reduce the amount of spectrum used and facilitate expanded, inter-
ference-free communications. Digital signal processing and soft-
ware-defined radio also provide means of increasing simultaneous
uses without interference. Perhaps one way to balance efficiency
and equity concerns would involve requiring developed nations to
implement spectrum conservation technologies on an expedited
basis, thereby freeing spectrum for use by operators in developed
nations. In recognition of their limited access to capital, perhaps
spectrum users in developing nations might receive a temporary
waiver of the requirement to use costly spectrum conservation
technologies.
It should come as no surprise that stakeholders, regardless of
national residence and wealth, seek access to spectrum at the low-
est cost, but also with the greatest degree of certainty of non-
interference. The ITU registration process, while not infallible, has
provided a degree of certainty that all nations will respect a previ-
ously recorded spectrum use. When INTELSAT served as the pri-
mary global satellite carrier, concerns about orbital slot congestion
did not exist.
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Advocates of competitive bidding for spectrum uses favor ex-
panding the rights and entitlements that property-style ownership
affords. Accordingly, prospective spectrum users in developed na-
tions increasingly express a willingness to bid cash for spectrum in
exchange for greater confidence that they can pursue their business
plans without worries about interference and congestion.
Developing nations and their constituents also seek access to
spectrum at the lowest cost. But perhaps these nations might forgo
access or use less desirable orbital slots and spectrum in exchange
for compensation or other types of accommodation. Because they
cannot readily vie for auctioned spectrum, operators in developing
nations will seek to maintain the status quo ITU registration proc-
ess, or some sort of compensation, in exchange for not blocking
and seeking to thwart market mechanisms. One should not under-
estimate the potential for developing nations to find their voice
and extract concessions. They hold a voting majority at the ITU
and while most matters do not result in a formal vote, these na-
tions can shape the debate. In light of the fractious nature of pre-
vious debates on transborder data flow and north/south inequal-
ity, developed nations should take pains to avoid triggering
another round by refraining from pressing too aggressively for
market-based initiatives, or costly technological requirements.
2.14.Risks in Competitive Bidding for Spectrum
At the behest of economists and with the incentive to bolster
the national treasury, some nations have licensed spectrum usage
through competitive bidding. Many economists assert that extract-
ing large financial bids for spectrum access maximizes social wel-
fare, ensures that spectrum will be put to the best possible uses,
and fosters efficiency. However, the outcome of recent auctions
shows that short-term financial windfalls may also result in less tax
revenue over the longer term, bid-rigging,76 overbidding leading to
bankruptcies and confusion over who retains title to the spectrum,
and the potential for market concentration.
76 See Owen M. Kendler, Comment, Auction Theory Can Complement Competi-
tion Law: Preventing Collusion in Europe's 3G Spectrum Allocation, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 153 (2002) (suggesting "that appropriate auction design can be used in
tandem with competition law to prevent buyer cartels in auctions. Auctions, like
other markets, are susceptible to collusion, yet competition law is not able to pun-
ish all violations of competition law or oligopolistic market distortions.").
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Developing nations may consider competitive bidding for spec-
trum a relatively painless way to shore up the national treasury,
much like privatization of the government-owned Post Telephone
and Telegraph Administration. However, one should appreciate
the short term. One-shot injection of capital will be offset by fac-
tors that may result in less tax and other revenues accruing in the
long term. Conferring greater aspects of ownership and control
over spectrum makes it virtually impossible for national govern-
ments to impose public interest and public service obligations.
Privatizing spectrum converts a shared global resource into some-
thing akin to a long-term usage franchise. Franchisees expect to
treat their spectrum awards as private property over which gov-
ernment has limited authority.
The degree to which a national government has confidence in
marketplace resource allocation constitutes a key factor in the na-
ture of spectrum management for that nation. Nations having con-
fidence in the ability of markets to operate and to maximize private
and public benefits typically have a greater propensity to license
spectrum through competitive bidding. Nations with less confi-
dence in the utility of market-driven spectrum use, or ones that
have experienced dissatisfaction with their initial spectrum auc-
tion, appear more inclined to use older regulatory models high-
lighting government oversight.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS
Developing nations need to extract concessions from developed
nations in ways that do not come across as extortion. Historically,
developing nations have gained little from rhetoric, grand unilat-
eral proclamations, or from the private auction strategies of single
nations such as Tonga. It does not appear that the ITU will expand
the set of frequencies and services that it will reserve for future use
by developing nations in the face of compelling current demand by
users in developed countries.
The best strategy for disenfranchised nations appears to com-
bine active participation in the ITU process coupled with resump-
tion of cooperative investment pooling and extracting technologi-
cal concessions from developed nations. Developing nations
should take every opportunity to include equity issues in ITU de-
liberations, but in a way that does not block progress. Users in de-
veloped countries can conserve spectrum and reduce the potential
for interference by implementing technological remedies that users
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in developing nations cannot afford to implement immediately.
Accordingly, the ITU might establish a recommendation that cou-
ples additional spectrum and satellite orbital slot registrations with
an affirmative duty borne by developed-nation stakeholders to
implement spectrum conservation technologies.
Another option might involve the partial adoption of market
resource allocation techniques. Instead of auctioning off spectrum,
nations could engage in the trading of access rights. Pollution
abatement strategies provide a helpful case study for spectrum
management. Because developed nations create the most pollu-
tion, their producers might pay for the right to exceed a pollution
threshold in lieu of having to bear the expense in reducing harmful
emissions. In the United States, some less developed states gener-
ate comparatively less pollution than other more industrialized
states. The United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") is considering a proposal to allow manufacturers and
other enterprises the opportunity to secure additional pollution
"rights" from enterprises that generate comparatively less pollu-
tion whether through reduced production, or through pollution
abatement investments. 77 Perhaps a similar sort of transfer pay-
77 "Pollution credit trading has been promoted by economists for years and,
in the United States, is finally being considered seriously to deal with problems
ranging from air and water pollution to global warming and the loss of wetlands
and biodiversity." Dennis M. King, Managing Environmental Trades: Lessons from
Hollywood, Stockholm, and Houston, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,317 (2002). See also Water
Quality Trading Policy: Proposed Policy, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,709 (May 15, 2002) (invit-
ing comments on the EPA's proposed policy to signal EPA support for soundly-
designed water quality trading programs developed by states and tribes); Dana L.
Hoag & Jennie S. Hughes-Popp, The Theory and Practice of Pollution Credit Trading
in Water Quality Management, 19 REv. AGRIC. EcoN. 252 (1997).
Under a pollution trading system, a regulatory agency establishes a per-
formance goal for an industry or area and then allocates increments of al-
lowable pollution to each business unit in the industry or area. Because
the cost of meeting their performance-based goals will differ among
firms, firms with low pollution control costs should invest in a lot of pol-
lution control, and firms with high pollution control costs should invest
in less. Marketable permits allow firms to exchange increments of their
performance-based goals so that the marginal cost of pollution control is
equal across firms, with some firms exceeding their allocated pollution
increment and others falling short. An added benefit to the tradable
permit system is that it should stimulate investment in cost-effective pol-
lution control technology because firms that can reduce the cost of pollu-
tion control can benefit by selling their allocated pollution increments.
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